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Abstract—Controlling confidential information in concurrent
systems is difficult, due to covert channels resulting from inter-
action between threads. This problem is exacerbated if threads
share resources at fine granularity.
In this work, we propose a novel monitoring framework to
enforce strong information security in concurrent programs. Our
monitors are hybrid, combining dynamic and static program
analysis to enforce security in a sound and rather precise fashion.
In our framework, each thread is guarded by its own local
monitor, and there is a single global monitor. We instantiate our
monitoring framework to support rely-guarantee style reasoning
about the use of shared resources, at the granularity of individual
memory locations, and then specialize local monitors further to
enforce flow-sensitive progress-sensitive information-flow control.
Our local monitors exploit rely-guarantee-style reasoning about
shared memory to achieve high precision. Soundness of rely-
guarantee-style reasoning is guaranteed by all monitors coop-
eratively. The global monitor is invoked only when threads
synchronize, and so does not needlessly restrict concurrency. We
prove that our hybrid monitoring approach enforces a knowledge-
based progress-sensitive noninterference security condition.
Keywords-Language-based security; information-flow control
for concurrent systems; hybrid information-flow monitor.
I. INTRODUCTION
Computer systems increasingly exhibit concurrency, includ-
ing systems that handle confidential information. Providing
confidentiality in concurrent systems is challenging, as sharing
of resources and synchronization may create covert channels,
thus facilitating inadvertent leakage of sensitive information.
An additional challenge is to enforce confidentiality without
unnecessarily limiting or reducing concurrency.
Most previous mechanisms to control the flow of sensitive
information (and to prevent information leaks) are inadequate in
the presence of modern concurrency features. Operating system
abstractions (e.g., [1, 2]) are too coarse grained to control
information flow between concurrent threads that share fine-
grained resources. Purely static mechanisms (e.g., [3, 4, 5, 6, 7])
are often too restrictive with respect to sharing of resources and
synchronization between threads. Purely dynamic mechanisms
(such as information-flow control monitors [8, 9, 10, 11]) have
not yet been extended to handle fine-grained concurrency, due in
part to the difficulties in dynamically and efficiently preventing
covert channels resulting from thread interactions.
We investigate hybrid information-flow control for enforcing
confidentiality in concurrent programs. Hybrid information-
flow control monitors (or, simply, hybrid monitors) combine
static and dynamic program analysis to secure the flow of
information in a system. We present a general framework for
monitoring concurrent programs, and instantiate this framework
for information-flow security. In our framework, monitoring
occurs at two levels: each thread is guarded by a local monitor,
and there is a single global monitor to provide control across
threads. We enable modular, rely-guarantee-style reasoning
about the behavior of multi-threaded programs by extending the
concepts of modes and mode states [12] to a dynamic setting.
Our global monitor ensures that assumptions made by threads
regarding the exclusive or shared use of memory are justified.
Our local monitors ensure that individual threads provide
the guarantees they promise. Our local monitors additionally
control information flow within the guarded threads. The global
monitor is not concerned with information-flow control; its
sole purpose is to ensure that all assumptions are justified.
Crucially, these assumptions can be exploited by the local
monitors to establish information-flow control, both effectively
and precisely.
Threads’ assumptions about memory resources may change
only at synchronization points. Thus, the global monitor is
accessed only when threads synchronize, and the global monitor
does not needlessly restrict concurrency in the program. Exist-
ing hybrid information-flow control monitors for concurrent
programs (e.g., [13]) use a single monitor shared by all threads,
thus causing unnecessary synchronization between threads.
This article’s contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We provide efficient and precise information-flow control for
concurrent programs using hybrid monitors. Our monitoring
approach is novel: each thread has its own local monitor,
and there is a single global monitor. Efficiency is achieved
because the global monitor is accessed only at thread
synchronization points, and so does not needlessly restrict
concurrency. We prove that our monitors enforce a progress-
sensitive noninterference-like security guarantee.
• The generic framework for monitoring concurrent programs
is itself a novel technical contribution. It enables sound
rely-guarantee-style reasoning in a dynamic setting, where
the global monitor ensures the compatibility of assumptions
made with guarantees provided by threads, and the local
monitors enforce the guarantees promised by threads. Local
monitors can be specialized to impose further constraints
on the guarded thread. By exploiting assumptions, local
monitors are able to effectively enforce also global system
properties. This is the feature from which we benefit in our
hybrid solution for information-flow security.
We consider a simple imperative concurrent calculus, with
input and output operators and barrier synchronization. Our
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local monitors support flow-sensitive security types [14], which
facilitates precise reasoning about information flow via program
variables. A thread may soundly allow the security level of a
variable to change only if the thread has exclusive read-access
or exclusive write-access to the variable.
Our local monitors separately track upper bounds on infor-
mation that may be revealed by the relative order of events
(the timing level of a thread) and information that may be
revealed by learning whether control has reached the current
program point or diverged earlier (the termination level of a
thread). These levels are analogous to the pc level traditionally
used in security-type systems for non-concurrent programs [3].
The termination level enables us to enforce progress sensi-
tive security [15], a generalization of termination sensitive
security [16] to interactive programs. Most existing work on
enforcing information-flow security ignores progress sensitivity
due to the complexity and imprecision of the enforcement
mechanism. Use of the timing level enables us to prevent
internal timing leaks [17]. Although the termination level of a
thread increases monotonically, we provide additional precision
by lowering the timing level of threads at synchronization
points, since synchronization between threads restricts the
relative order of events before and after the synchronization.
Our work leverages the insight that resetting the timing levels of
threads at synchronization points is analogous to lowering the
pc level at post-dominators of control-flow branches [17, 3, 18].
II. INFORMATION FLOW IN CONCURRENT PROGRAMS
In this section, we provide intuition for how concurrency and
progress sensitivity complicate the enforcement of information-
flow security, and for how our monitors enforce security in this
challenging setting. We then present our general framework for
monitoring concurrent programs (Sections III–IV), instantiate it
for rely-guarantee reasoning (Section V), and further instantiate
it to enforce information-flow security (Sections VI–VII).
Due to space restrictions, we provide only proof sketches.
A full version of this article [19] provides detailed proofs and
additional material, such as calculus rules that we omit here.
Information flow through concurrent access: Confiden-
tial information may be inadvertently leaked through thread
interaction. For example, consider the following (insecure) pro-
gram, which consists of two threads that execute concurrently.
Thread 1: input H to foo; output foo× 2 to H
Thread 2: foo := 42; output foo to L
The first thread inputs confidential information from high-
security channel H , stores it in variable foo, and then outputs
2 times foo to channel H . The other thread sets foo to the
constant integer 42, then outputs foo to low-security channel
L, which we assume can be observed by an adversary. Each
of these threads is intuitively secure if it were executed in
isolation. However, when executed concurrently, since they
both access foo, it is possible that Thread 2 will output
confidential information to channel L, violating security by
revealing confidential information to the attacker. Indeed, if an
observer of channel L sees an output of anything other than
42, she can infer the confidential input.
Fine-grained resource sharing: Following the work of
Mantel, Sands, and Sudbrock [12], we support fine-grained
reasoning about threads’ access to shared resources (like the
variable foo in the example above) in order to prevent security
violations via thread interaction through such resources. Each
thread uses rely-guarantee reasoning about what variables it
and other concurrently executing threads might read or write.
Consider, for example, the following (secure) program, where
Thread 1 assumes that no other threads will read variable w
(note that Thread 1 stores confidential information in w), and
Thread 2 assumes that no other threads will write variable
v (note that Thread 2 sends the content of v to channel L).
Provided both assumptions hold, the program is secure, even
in the presence of additional threads.
Thread 1: input H to w; output w + v to H
Thread 2: v := 14; output v × 42 to L
Threads’ assumptions and guarantees originate from protocols
the concurrently running threads comply with, where coordina-
tion among threads is often achieved through synchronization
mechanisms. In the following (secure) example, Thread 1 has
exclusive access to variable y before the barrier, and Thread 2
has exclusive access after the barrier.
Thread 1: input L to y; barrier
Thread 2: barrier; output y to L
Assumptions and guarantees of threads must be compatible
when threads are composed. We assume that a thread’s
assumptions are stated explicitly. We use the global monitor
to impose the corresponding guarantees on all other threads,
and use the local monitors of the threads ensure that these
guarantees are indeed provided. Thus, our approach supports
fine-grained resource sharing while preventing information
leakage through concurrent access.
Information flow through nondeterminism: Information
can also be leaked when the relative order of observable
events (such as outputs to low-security channels) depend on
confidential information. In the following (insecure) example,
the output on channel L is either 0 followed by 1, or vice versa,
where the order likely depends on confidential information.
Thread 1: input h to H; while h > 0 do h := h− 1 od;
output 1 to L
Thread 2: output 0 to L
Our monitors prevent information leakage by this program
as follows: Regardless of the value of the confidential input,
Thread 1’s local monitor notices that the relative ordering
between its own output and output of other threads might be
influenced by the while loop, and, hence, the local monitor
intervenes by blocking the thread’s execution before the
output occurs. The following program is, however, secure and
permitted by our monitors.
Thread 1: input h to H; while h > 0 do h := h− 1 od;
barrier; output 1 to L
Thread 2: barrier; output 0 to L
Even though the relative order of the low outputs is
undetermined, the threads cannot perform the output until
after the barrier. Intuitively, the program is secure because the
synchronization between threads ensures that the order of the
low output does not depend on confidential information, even
though the low output is nondeterministic [20, 21].
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To correctly and precisely track what information might be
revealed by the relative timing of events, each local monitor
tracks the timing level, a security level that is an upper
bound on information that has influenced the timing of the
thread’s execution with respect to other threads. Since after
synchronization, the relative timing of threads is independent of
information that affected the timing before the synchronization,
the timing level of a thread can be lowered immediately
after synchronization. This is similar to information-flow
control in single-threaded programs, where the pc level (a
bound on the information that influences whether the current
statement is executed) can be lowered at post-dominators of
control flow decisions. That is, synchronization points are the
post-dominators of concurrent programs, and allow a similar
improvement in precision.
Precision of hybrid monitors: Our use of monitors
improves the precision of security enforcement, since we
consider the security of a single execution, and do not need
to determine whether all possible program executions are
secure. For example, our monitor permits complete execution
of the following single-threaded program if the low input is
positive. In contrast, a static analysis would have to classify this
program as insecure, because executing it will leak confidential
information if the low input is negative or zero.
input L to low;
if low > 0 then input L to x else input H to x fi;
output x to L
Progress sensitivity: If confidential information influences
whether a program terminates, observing the termination or
non-termination of a program can leak confidential information.
This is exacerbated in interactive settings [15] (i.e., where the
program produces observable events before the end of the
program) and concurrent settings (where many threads may
each reveal a small amount of information). For example, in
the following (insecure) program, the program silently diverges
after outputting a low value that is equal to the secret (i.e.,
it diverges without producing any further output). Thus, an
observer of channel L can learn the secret by noting the last
value output.
input H to high; low := 0;
while 1 do
output low to L;
if low<high then low := low+1 else (while 1 do skip od) fi
od
An additional concern is that an enforcement mechanism
itself might reveal information. In the following (insecure)
program, if the secret is positive, a monitor might intervene
to prevent the insecure output of high to L by blocking the
thread. As a consequence, the output of 42 to channel L would
never occur and, hence, an observer of L could infer that the
secret must be a positive value, once she realizes that 42 will
not be output.
input H to high;
if high > 0 then output high to L else skip fi;
output 42 to L
We prevent information leaks via termination and monitor
interventions by tracking the termination level and blocking
level of each thread within our local monitors. These are upper
bounds on information that might have influenced, respectively,
the termination behavior of loops and the blocking behavior
of the monitor. By tracking these levels, we ensure that the
termination and blocking behavior does not leak information.
III. MONITORED MULTI-THREADED COMPUTATIONS
We propose a formal model for multi-threaded programs
that interact with their environment via channels and whose
concurrent threads communicate with each other using shared
memory. In our model, we reuse the concepts of modes and
of mode states from [12] to facilitate rely-guarantee-style
reasoning about the behavior of such programs.
The novelty of our model is that it supports reasoning about
multi-threaded programs that are monitored. In our model,
programs can be monitored at two levels: local monitors provide
control over individual threads while global monitors provide
control across threads. By lifting the concept of mode states
to threads that are monitored, we enable rely-guarantee-style
reasoning both about monitored programs and within monitors.
We recall the concepts of modes and of mode states in
Section III-A, and also define a formal notation for mode state
changes. In Section III-B, we introduce judgments that capture
the behavior of local and global monitors. This provides the
basis for lifting the concepts of mode states to multi-threaded
programs that are monitored in Section III-C.
Notation: We denote the powerset of a set S by P(S). We
use A→ B and A⇀B to denote the set of all total functions
and all partial functions, respectively, with domain A and range
B. We denote the pre-image of a function f : A⇀B by pre(f),
i.e., pre(f) = {a ∈ A | f(a) ∈ B}. We denote the update
of a function f by f [d 7→ v], where f [d 7→ v](d) = v and
f [d 7→ v](d′) = f(d′) for d′ ∈ pre(f) \ {d}.
We refer to partial functions with domain N0, range A,
and a finite pre-image of consecutive numbers starting at 0
as lists over A, and denote the set of all such lists by A∗.
We use  to denote the empty list, l·a to denote the list that
results from appending an element a ∈ A to the end of a
list l ∈ A∗, and l1·l2 to denote the concatenation of two lists
l1, l2 ∈ A∗. The function filter removes from a list over A
those elements that do not satisfy a predicate p ⊆ A, i.e.,
filter(p, ) = , filter(p, l·a) = filter(p, l)·a if a ∈ p, and
filter(p, l·a) = filter(p, l) if a /∈ p.
A. Modes, Mode States, and Annotations
We use modes [12] to capture a program developer’s
expectations about the environment in which a program shall
run as well as his intentions. For instance, a program might be
designed to use a particular communication protocol with its
environment and, hence, a thread running such a program will
provide the desired functionality only in an environment that
complies with this protocol. Such a convention incorporates
both an expectation (namely that the environment will follow
the protocol) and an intention (namely that the thread itself is
programmed correctly to follow the protocol).
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In general, modes can be used to express assumptions
and guarantees about arbitrary entities that are relevant for
a program’s behavior. In this article, we restrict ourselves to
modes that express assumptions and guarantees about particular
entities, namely program variables. More concretely, we focus
on assumptions about which variables might be read and written
by a thread’s environment and the dual guarantees. We use
Var to denote the set of all variables.
We use the symbols A-NR and A-NW to express the
assumption that a particular variable will not be read and
will not be written, respectively, by the environment of a
given thread. Moreover, we use the symbols G-NR and G-NW
to express the guarantee that a thread will not read and
will not write, respectively, a particular variable. That is,
the modes A-NR and G-NR are dual to each other, and so
are the modes A-NW and G-NW. We refer to the modes
A-NR and A-NW as the no-read and the no-write assumption.
Moreover, we refer to the modes G-NR and G-NW as the
no-read and the no-write guarantee. Formally, we define the
set of assumptions by Asm = {A-NR,A-NW}, the set of
guarantees by Gua = {G-NR,G-NW}, and the set of all modes
by Mod = Asm ∪Gua .
We use mode states [12] to track which assumptions are
made and which guarantees are provided. Formally, a mode
state is a function mdst : Mod → P(Var) that returns the
set of all variables that are in a given mode. Accordingly, we
define the set of all mode states by MdSt = Mod → P(Var).
We use terms of the form acq(mod,X) and rel(mod,X)
to specify that the mode mod is acquired and released,
respectively, for all variables in the set X ⊆ Var . We call
such terms annotations and define the set of all annotations
by Ann = {acq(mod,X), rel(mod,X) | mod ∈ Mod , X ⊆
Var}. For singleton sets of variables, we use a shorthand
notation and write acq(mod, x) instead of acq(mod, {x}).
Similarly, we write rel(mod, x) instead of rel(mod, {x}).
We introduce the predicate Has-Mode-In ⊆ Ann ×
P(Mod) to identify annotations with particular modes. We
define this predicate by ann Has-Mode-In M iff ann ∈
{acq(mod,X), rel(mod,X) | X ⊆ Var ∧ mod ∈ M} and
the projection of a list of annotations γ to a set of modes M
by γ M = filter(λann ∈ Ann : ann Has-Mode-In M,γ).
To model the effects of annotations on mode states, we
define the function update : (MdSt ×Ann)→ MdSt by
update(mdst, acq(mod,X)) =
mdst[mod 7→(mdst(mod)∪X)]
update(mdst, rel(mod,X)) =
mdst[mod 7→(mdst(mod)\X)]
Overloading notation, we lift the function update : (MdSt×
Ann) → MdSt to a function update : (MdSt×Ann?) →
MdSt on lists of annotations by update(mdst, ) = mdst
and update(mdst, γ·ann) = update(update(mdst, γ), ann),
where mdst ∈ MdSt , ann ∈ Ann, and γ ∈ Ann?.
For instance, the annotation acq(A-NW, x) can be used to
specify that a thread from now on runs under the assumption
that variable x is not written by other threads, mdst(A-NW)
equals the set of all variables for which the no-write as-
sumption is made in mode state mdst, and, in particular,
x ∈ (update(mdst, acq(A-NW, x)))(A-NW) holds.
B. Monitors and Events
To control the behavior of individual threads, each thread
is guarded by a local monitor which is invoked each time
the thread performs a computation step. We use local events
to capture information about computation steps needed by a
local monitor. We denote the set of all local events by Ev,
use α ∈ Ev as a meta-variable, use LMon to denote the
set of all possible internal states of local monitors, and use
lmon ∈ LMon as a meta-variable for local monitor states.
We employ the judgment lmon −→δ,αperm lmon ′ to capture
that a local monitor in state lmon ∈ LMon permits the
combination of α ∈ Ev and δ ∈ Ann?. The local monitor’s
internal state is updated to lmon ′ ∈ LMon .
To control the behavior across threads, a multi-threaded
program is guarded by one global monitor. We use global
events to capture the information about such steps that is needed
by the global monitor. We denote the set of all global events by
GEv , use β ∈ GEv as a meta-variable, use GMonn to denote
the set of all possible internal states of global monitors for pool
states with n threads, and identify the initial global monitor
states in these sets by gmoninit,n ∈ GMonn. We define the
set of all global monitor states by GMon =
⋃
n∈N0 GMonn
and use gmon ∈ GMon as a meta-variable.
In this article, we use the global monitor only to control
mode-state updates. To simplify our exposition, we assume
that threads update their mode state only when synchronizing
with other threads, and we consider only one synchronization
primitive, namely global barrier synchronization. Consequently,
the global monitor needs to be invoked only when the program
passes a barrier and only needs to distinguish between two
global events: sync for barrier synchronization and  for all
other steps. Throughout this article, the set of all global events
is GEv = {sync, }. We use a function χ : Ev → GEv to
extract the corresponding global event from a local event.
When passing a barrier, each alive thread requests changes
to its mode state, and the global monitor decides if a given
combination of requests by the individual threads is permissible.
Moreover, the global monitor may decide to impose mode-state
changes on threads that differ from the requested mode-state
changes. We employ the judgment gmon −→Γ,∆ gmon ′ to
capture that a global monitor in state gmon ∈ GMon accepts
the combination of mode-state-change requests modeled by Γ,
imposes the mode-state changes modeled by ∆ in response,
and updates its internal state to gmon ′. Formally, Γ and ∆ are
functions of type N → Ann?, where N ⊆ N0 is a finite set.
That is, Γ and ∆ return a list of annotations for each number
in their pre-image. As explained later, whenever we use this
judgment, N is the set of identifiers of all threads that are
alive when the global monitor is invoked.
We provide a concrete instantiation of GMonn and
gmoninit,n together with a calculus for global monitor tran-
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sitions (i.e., for deriving gmon −→Γ,∆ gmon ′) in Section V.
In Section VI, we provide instantiations of Ev and of χ.
An instantiation of LMon and a calculus for local monitor
transitions are presented in Section VII.
C. Monitored, Multi-threaded Computations
We capture control states of individual threads by terms
that we call commands, use Com to denote the set of all
commands, and express that a thread has terminated by the
special command term ∈ Com .
We capture local states of individual threads by thread states
and collections of the local states of multiple threads by pool
states. Formally, a thread state is a triple [com, lmon,mdst],
where com ∈ Com , lmon ∈ LMon , and mdst ∈ MdSt .
Accordingly, we define the set of all thread states by ThSt =
Com×LMon×MdSt . Formally, a pool state is a list of thread
states. We define the set of all pool states with n threads by
PStn = {0, . . . , n− 1} → ThSt and define the set of all pool
states with arbitrarily many threads by PSt =
⋃
n∈N0 PStn.
We use thread ∈ ThSt as meta-variable for thread states and
pool ∈ PSt as a meta-variable for pool states.
From a thread state thread = [com, lmon,mdst], we
retrieve its components with selector functions, defined
by thread.com = com, thread.lmon = lmon , and
thread.mdst = mdst. For instance, (pool(i)).mdst equals
the mode state of the ith thread in the pool state pool.
We introduce the predicate Alive ⊆ ThSt to capture
that a thread has not yet terminated by Alive (thread) ≡
thread.com 6= term. To retrieve the identifiers of those threads
in a given pool state pool ∈ PSt that have not yet terminated
and that have terminated, respectively, we define the functions
alive : PSt → P(N0) and terminated : PSt → P(N0)
by alive(pool) = {i ∈ pre(pool) | Alive (pool(i))} and
terminated(pool) = pre(pool) \ alive(pool).
Threads communicate with each other via a globally shared
memory and with their environment via channels. We model
the state of the shared memory by a function from variables
to values and the history of prior communications on a given
channel by a trace. Formally, we use Val to denote the set
of all values, define the set of states of the shared memory
by Mem = Var → Val , and use Ch to denote the set of all
channels. We model that a value v ∈ Val is received from
channel ch ∈ Ch and that v is output on ch by the terms
inp(ch, v) and out(ch, v), respectively. We refer to such terms
as interactions and denote the set of all interactions by IO .
We call lists of interactions traces, define the set of all traces
by Tr = IO?, and use τ ∈ Tr as a meta-variable for traces.
We capture the behavior of a program’s environment by a
communication strategy. A strategy determines which input
the environment supplies to a program on a given channel
after a sequence of prior interactions. Formally, a strategy is
a function σ : (Tr × Ch) → Val such that σ(τ, ch) is the
value supplied next on channel ch if all prior interactions are
captured by the trace τ . We use Σ to denote the set of all
such strategies.
Configurations: For capturing snapshots during program
execution, we employ three layers of configurations: global
configurations, local configurations, and command configura-
tions, where global and local configurations incorporate the
state of a global monitor and of a local monitor, respectively.
We use global configurations to model global snapshots
during a program run. Formally, a global configuration gcnf
is a quadruple 〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉, where pool ∈ PSt ,
mem ∈ Mem , τ ∈ Tr , and gmon ∈ GMon . In the global
configuration gcnf , the pool state pool captures the local state
of each thread of the multi-threaded program, the memory state
mem captures the content of all memory locations, the trace
τ captures the inputs and outputs that have occurred so far,
and gmon captures the internal state of the global monitor.
We use local configurations to capture the local view of
individual threads during a run. Formally, a local configuration
lcnf is a triple 〈thread,mem, τ〉 where thread ∈ ThSt ,
mem ∈ Mem , and τ ∈ Tr . While the thread state thread
models a thread’s local state, mem and τ model the content
of the memory and the prior communications, respectively.
In a global configuration 〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉, the local
configuration of thread i is 〈pool(i),mem, τ〉.
We use command configurations to define the local effects of
computation steps. Formally, a command configuration ccnf
is a triple (com,mem, τ), where com ∈ Com , mem ∈ Mem ,
and τ ∈ Tr . While com models a thread’s internal state, mem
and τ model the memory content and the prior communications,
respectively. The command configuration of a local configura-
tion 〈[com, lmon,mdst],mem, τ〉 is (com,mem, τ).
We use GCnf , LCnf , and CCnf to denote the set of all
global, local, and command configurations, respectively.
Judgments: For capturing the effects of computation steps
at the level of global, local, and command configurations,
respectively, we employ the following three judgments:
gcnf σ gcnf ′ lcnf
β,γ,δ−→σ lcnf ′ ccnf
α,γ_σ ccnf ′
A strategy σ ∈ Σ appears as a subscript of the arrow in all
three judgments. It captures the communication strategy of
the program’s environment. For instance, the first judgment
captures that a transition from a global configuration gcnf to
a global configuration gcnf ′ is possible under the strategy σ.
The arrow in the second judgment carries three additional
annotations: a global event β ∈ GEv and two lists of
annotations γ, δ ∈ Ann? that serve different purposes. While
γ captures which changes to its mode state a thread desires, δ
captures which mode state changes are imposed on the thread in
response. The arrow in the third judgment carries as annotations
a local event α ∈ Ev and a list of annotations γ ∈ Ann? that
captures which changes to its mode state a thread desires.
In the remainder of this section, we provide calculi for
the judgments lcnf
β,γ,δ−→σ lcnf ′ and gcnf σ gcnf ′. An
exemplary calculus for the judgment ccnf
α,γ_σ ccnf ′ is
provided in Section VI together with an instantiation of Com .
As usual, these calculi induce transition relations. For
instance, the calculus for local configurations induces a fam-
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ily of transition relations (
β,γ,δ−→σ)β∈GEv ,γ,δ∈Ann?,σ∈Σ , where
β,γ,δ−→σ relates two local configurations lcnf and lcnf ′ iff
lcnf
β,γ,δ−→σ lcnf ′ is derivable. We use the usual notation for the
reflexive, transitive closure of such relations, i.e., for instance,
(
β,γ,δ−→σ)∗ denotes the reflexive, transitive closure of β,γ,δ−→σ .
Local Transitions: The judgment lcnf β,γ,δ−→σ lcnf ′
defines which transitions between local configurations are
possible. The only rule for deriving instances of this judgment
is depicted in Fig. 1.
The judgment for transitions between command configura-
tions in the first premise of the rule in Fig. 1 reflects that
a thread’s behavior is determined by the command that this
thread is executing. In this article, we employ local monitors
to guard the behavior of individual threads. Accordingly, the
judgment for transitions between local monitor states is used
in the second premise to capture that the local monitor must
deem the step acceptable. Note that the transition between
local monitor states is based on δ and not on γ, i.e., it is based
on the mode state changes imposed on the thread, not on the
mode state changes requested by the thread. Also note that
δ is used to update the mode state in the third premise. The
global event β is extracted from the local event α using the
function χ : Ev → GEv in the last premise of the rule.
Global Transitions: Transitions between global config-
urations are captured by the judgment gcnf σ gcnf ′.
To simplify our presentation, we make three restrictions.
First, we assume that the process structure is static, i.e., if
〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉 σ 〈〈pool′,mem′, τ ′, gmon ′〉〉 then
pre(pool′) = pre(pool). Second, we assume that threads are
scheduled nondeterministically. Third, as stated before, we
assume that barrier synchronization is the only synchronization
primitive and that threads only request changes to their mode
state when they pass a barrier.
The two rules for deriving instances of the judgment
gcnf σ gcnf ′ are depicted in Fig. 2. The first rule captures
steps by individual threads, and the second rule captures a
barrier synchronization across all threads.
According to the first rule in Fig. 2, an alive thread i
(first premise) may be chosen nondeterministically to perform
a computation step (second premise). This step must not
involve synchronization (third premise), must neither request
nor impose mode state changes (fourth premise), and must
not affect the global monitor state (fifth premise). Such a
step by an individual thread might affect the thread’s control
state, the state of the local monitor supervising this thread, the
shared memory, and the trace. It cannot affect the mode state
of this thread (since δ = ), the local states of other threads
(conclusion of the rule), and the global monitor state (since
gmon ′ = gmon).
The second rule in Fig. 2 captures synchronization steps.
This rule requires that all alive threads jointly pass a barrier (last
premise of the rule), which faithfully reflects the intuition of a
barrier synchronization. In order to perform a synchronization
step, at least one thread must be alive (first premise). The
function Γ captures which mode state changes are requested by
the individual alive threads (last premise). That is, Γ(i) is the
list of annotations capturing the mode state changes requested
by the ith thread, where i ∈ alive(pool). The function ∆
captures the mode state changes that are imposed on the
individual threads (last premise). Which mode state changes are
imposed on the individual threads in response to their requests
is determined by the global monitor (third premise). Note that
the set of threads cannot change during a synchronization
step (fourth premise) and that the thread states of terminated
threads remain unmodified (fifth premise). Also note that a
synchronization step cannot affect the shared memory or the
trace (conclusion of the rule). Synchronization steps can only
affect the thread state of all alive threads and the state of the
global monitor (conclusion of the rule).
Reachability: We say that a global configuration gcnf ′
is reachable from a global configuration gcnf under a
strategy σ iff gcnf (σ)∗ gcnf ′ holds. We assume that
runs of multi-threaded programs start in an initial memory
meminit that assigns a dedicated value vinit ∈ Val to all
variables (i.e., ∀x ∈ Var : meminit(x) = vinit ) and with
an empty initial trace τinit (i.e., τinit = ). We say that a
global configuration gcnf ′ is reachable from a pool state
pool under a strategy σ iff gcnf ′ is reachable from the
global configuration 〈〈pool,meminit , τinit , gmoninit,n〉〉 under
σ, where n = |pre(pool)|. We use greachσ(gcnf) and
reachσ(pool) to denote the set of all global configurations
reachable from gcnf ∈ GCnf and pool ∈ PSt , respectively,
under σ ∈ Σ.
IV. SEMANTICS OF MODES
We formally define what it means for a thread to provide a
guarantee and what it means for an assumption to be justified.
While we define the semantics of G-NR and G-NW in terms
of transitions between local configurations, we define the
semantics of A-NR and A-NW for a given thread in terms
of guarantees given by other threads in a global configuration.
Based on the formal semantics of modes, we define conditions
that allow one to soundly exploit assumptions when reasoning
about the behavior of multi-threaded programs.
Semantics of G-NW and G-NR: We say that a local
configuration lcnf = 〈thread,mem, τ〉 provides the no-write
guarantee for a variable x iff the value of x will remain
unmodified by each next possible step of the thread. This
requirement is captured by the following formula:
∀σ ∈ Σ : ∀β ∈ GEv : ∀γ, δ ∈ Ann? :
∀〈thread′,mem′, τ ′〉 ∈ LCnf :
〈thread,mem, τ〉 β,γ,δ−→σ 〈thread′,mem′, τ ′〉
=⇒ mem′(x) = mem(x)
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(com,mem, τ)
α,γ_σ (com′,mem′, τ ′) lmon −→δ,αperm lmon ′ mdst′ = update(mdst, δ) β = χ(α)
〈[com, lmon,mdst],mem, τ〉 β,γ,δ−→σ 〈[com′, lmon ′,mdst′],mem′, τ ′〉
Fig. 1. Transitions between local configurations
i ∈ alive(pool) 〈pool(i),mem, τ〉 β,γ,δ−→σ 〈thread′,mem′, τ ′〉 β =  γ = δ =  gmon ′ = gmon
〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉σ 〈〈pool[i 7→ thread′],mem′, τ ′, gmon ′〉〉
alive(pool) 6= ∅ Γ,∆ : alive(pool) −→ Ann? gmon −→Γ,∆ gmon ′ pool′ ∈ PSt |pre(pool)|
∀j ∈ terminated(pool) : pool′(j) = pool(j) ∀i ∈ alive(pool) : (〈pool(i),mem, τ〉 sync,Γ(i),∆(i)−→σ 〈pool′(i),mem, τ〉)
〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉σ〈〈pool′,mem, τ, gmon ′〉〉
Fig. 2. Transitions between global configurations
We say that a local configuration lcnf = 〈thread,mem, τ〉
provides the no-read guarantee for a variable y iff
∀σ ∈ Σ : ∀β ∈ GEv : ∀γ, δ ∈ Ann? :
∀〈thread′,mem′, τ ′〉 ∈ LCnf : ∀v ∈ Val :
〈thread,mem, τ〉 β,γ,δ−→σ 〈thread′,mem′, τ ′〉
=⇒ 〈thread,mem[y 7→v],τ〉 β,γ,δ−→σ 〈thread′,mem′,τ ′〉 ∨
〈thread,mem[y 7→v],τ〉 β,γ,δ−→σ 〈thread′,mem′[y 7→v],τ ′〉
That is, a no-read guarantee for a variable y ensures that
changing the value of y before a computation step does not
alter the effects of this computation step. The two disjuncts on
the right-hand side of the implication correspond respectively to
the cases where y is overwritten and where y is not overwritten
in a computation step.
A local configuration lcnf=〈[com, lmon,mdst],mem, τ〉
provides its guarantees iff it provides the no-write guarantee
for each variable x ∈ mdst(G-NW) and the no-read guarantee
for each y ∈ mdst(G-NR). Consequently, if lcnf provides its
guarantees then the values of all variables in mdst(G-NW)
will remain unchanged by the thread’s next step and the values
of all variables in mdst(G-NR) will not affect the thread’s next
step. We say that a thread state thread provides its guarantees
iff, for all mem ∈ Mem and all τ ∈ Tr , the local configuration
〈thread,mem, τ〉 provides its guarantees. Moreover, we say
that gcnf = 〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉 provides its guarantees
iff pool(i) provides its guarantees for all i ∈ pre(pool).
Semantics of A-NW and A-NR: Given a global config-
uration gcnf = 〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉, we say that gcnf
justifies the assumption A-NW of a thread i ∈ pre(pool)
about a variable x iff every other alive thread has acquired the
mode G-NW for x. Similarly, we say that gcnf justifies the
assumption A-NR of a thread i∈pre(pool) about a variable y
iff every other alive thread has acquired the mode G-NR for y.
A global configuration gcnf = 〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉
justifies its assumptions iff gcnf justifies both the assumption
A-NW about each variable in (pool(i)).mdst(A-NW) and the
assumption A-NR about each variable in (pool(i)).mdst(A-NR)
for all i ∈ pre(pool). Note that assumptions of all threads,
including terminated threads, must be justified. In contrast, only
alive threads need to explicitly provide the dual guarantees
for assumptions of other threads. Terminated threads need not
acquire the modes G-NW and G-NR because, it is clear that
they will not be able to write or read variables in the future.
Sound use of modes: We say that a global configuration
gcnf ensures a sound use of modes iff, for each strategy σ ∈ Σ,
each reachable global configuration gcnf ′ ∈ greachσ(gcnf)
provides its guarantees and justifies its assumptions.
Moreover, we say that a pool state pool ensures a sound
use of modes iff 〈〈pool,meminit , τinit , gmoninit,n〉〉 ensures
a sound use of modes. If a pool state pool ensures a sound
use of modes then, at each intermediate state during each
possible run, each assumption made is justified by guarantees
that are, indeed, provided. Hence, all assumptions made can
be exploited soundly when reasoning about possible behaviors.
V. A MONITORING FRAMEWORK
We propose a framework for monitoring multi-threaded
programs based on our model of computation from Section III.
Our monitoring framework consists of the definition of a global
monitor and of a local monitor. The role of these monitors is
complementary. Our global monitor ensures that assumptions
made by threads are, indeed, justified. Our local monitor ensures
that an individual thread, indeed, provides the guarantees that
it promises to provide. The combination of one global monitor
and a local monitor at each thread jointly ensure a sound use
of modes and, hence, the soundness of modular, rely-guarantee-
style reasoning about the behavior of multi-threaded programs.
Our local monitor can be specialized to enforce additional
properties. By exploiting assumptions, local monitors can not
only establish properties of individual threads, but also global
properties of entire multi-threaded programs. We present a
specialization of local monitors for information-flow control in
Section VII and demonstrate that this specialization soundly
enforces end-to-end information-flow security.
Global Monitoring of Multi-threaded Programs: We
define a global monitor that grants all acquisitions and releases
of assumptions exactly as desired by each thread. In addition,
our global monitor ensures that all assumptions of all threads
are justified. To justify all assumptions, guarantees might be
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needed that differ from the guarantees that the individual
threads desire to provide. Consequently, our global monitor
cannot always grant modifications of guarantees according to
these desires.
Our global monitor keeps track of both the assumptions
that each alive thread currently makes and the assumptions
that each terminated thread had made when it terminated.
Formally, a global monitor state for n threads is a function that
returns a mode state for each thread identifier in {0, . . . , n−1}.
Accordingly, we instantiate the set of all global monitor states
for n threads by GMonn = {0, . . . , n − 1} −→ MdSt and
gmoninit,n ∈ GMonn, the initial global monitor state for n
threads, by gmoninit,n(i) = {} for all i ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
We say that a global monitor state gmon ∈ GMon
(recall GMon =
⋃
n∈N0 GMonn) is compatible with a
pool state pool ∈ PSt iff pre(gmon) = pre(pool) and
if (gmon(i))(mod) = (pool(i)).mdst(mod) for each i ∈
pre(pool) and mod ∈ Asm .
When threads modify their mode state, the global monitor
state is updated accordingly. To capture such updates of the
global monitor state, we define the function gmon-update :
(GMon × (N0⇀Ann?)) −→ GMon by
gmon-update(gmon,Γ) =
λi ∈ pre(gmon) :
if i ∈ pre(Γ) then update(gmon(i), (Γ(i) Asm))
else gmon(i)
Note that acquisitions and releases of guarantees in Γ(i) are
ignored when updating the global monitor state. Our global
monitor does not keep track of which guarantees threads
provide.
Our global monitor uses its internal state to determine
which guarantees must be imposed on each individual thread.
To determine the list of annotations that our global monitor
imposes on the individual threads, we define the function
gmon-impose : (GMon × (N0⇀Ann?)) −→ (N0⇀Ann?)
by
gmon-impose(gmon ′,Γ) =
let NW =λi ∈ pre(gmon ′) :⋃{(gmon ′(j))(A-NW) | j ∈ pre(gmon ′) \ {i}}
NR = λi ∈ pre(gmon ′) :⋃{(gmon ′(j))(A-NR) | j ∈ pre(gmon ′) \ {i}}
in λi ∈ pre(Γ) :(Γ(i) Asm)
·acq(G-NW,NW(i))·acq(G-NR,NR(i))
·rel(G-NW, pre(gmon ′) \ NW(i))
·rel(G-NR, pre(gmon ′) \ NR(i))
For each pair (gmon ′,Γ) with pre(Γ) ⊆ pre(gmon ′), the
function gmon-impose is well defined and returns a function
with the same pre-image as Γ.
Fig. 3 presents our global monitor. It is the only rule for
deriving instances of the judgment for transitions between
global monitor states. In the first premise of this rule, the
function gmon-update is used to update the global monitor
state based on the acquisitions and releases of assumptions in
Γ. The second premise ensures that the global monitor is aware
gmon ′ = gmon-update(gmon,Γ)
pre(Γ) ⊆ pre(gmon) ∆ = gmon-impose(gmon ′,Γ)
gmon −→Γ,∆ gmon ′
Fig. 3. Transitions between global monitor states
of all threads that request mode state changes. In the third
premise, the function gmon-impose is used to determine ∆,
i.e., the mode state changes to be imposed on all threads that
requested mode state changes. Due to the second premise of
the rule, gmon-impose is well defined for the arguments used.
Note that, for each i ∈ pre(gmon ′) and each assumption
in gmon ′(i), the corresponding guarantee is acquired in
(gmon-impose(gmon ′,Γ))(j) for all j ∈ pre(Γ) \ {i}. That
is, programs do not need to explicitly contain annotations to
acquire guarantees, since guarantees will be imposed on threads
if needed. This means that no program analysis or human effort
is required to determine the guarantees that threads provide.
Annotations for assumptions, however, do need to be provided
explicitly. There are practical analyses that can infer, e.g.,
whether a memory location is thread-local (i.e., exclusively
accessed by a thread). Such analyses might be suitable building
blocks to infer assumption annotations for programs.
Note also that guarantees are acquired in
(gmon-impose(gmon ′,Γ))(i) even if the ith thread is
providing these guarantees already. Analogously, guarantees
are released even if the ith thread is not providing them. Such
unnecessary acquisitions and releases of guarantees could
be avoided by letting the global monitor keep track of the
guarantees that the individual threads provide. We refrain from
elaborating this optimization here in more detail.
Local Monitoring of Individual Threads: Our local
monitor keeps track of assumptions that a monitored thread
makes and of guarantees that a thread provides. In this section,
we assume that the state of a local monitor incorporates a mode
state, but otherwise leave local monitor states under-specified.
We use lmon.mdst to denote the mode state within lmon ∈
LMon , and we say that a thread state [com, lmon,mdst] is
well formed iff lmon.mdst = mdst holds.
We say that a calculus for local monitor transitions properly
tracks modes iff the derivability of lmon −→δ,αperm lmon ′
implies lmon ′.mdst = update(lmon.mdst, δ). Moreover, we
say that a calculus for local monitor transitions enforces
guarantees iff it ensures that every well-formed thread state
provides its guarantees. We leave the calculus for local monitor
transitions unspecified. Such a calculus and a concrete definition
of LMon are provided in Section VII.
Sound Use of Modes: We say that a global configuration
gcnf = 〈〈pool,mem, τ, gmon〉〉 is well formed iff gmon is
compatible with pool and pool(i) is a well-formed thread state
for each i ∈ pre(pool).
The following theorem states that our framework soundly
enables rely-guarantee-style reasoning. This result is conditional
on two assumptions about the calculus for local monitor
transitions, which we discharge in Section VII (see Theorem 2).
8
Theorem 1. Let gcnf be a well-formed global configuration
that justifies its assumptions. If the calculus for local monitor
transitions properly tracks modes and enforces guarantees then
gcnf ensures a sound use of modes.
Proof sketch: Well-formedness is an invariant for global
configurations and justifying all assumptions is an invariant
for well-formed global configurations if the calculus for
local monitor transitions properly tracks modes. From these
invariants, we conclude that every global configuration gcnf ′
that is reachable from gcnf is also well formed and justifies
its assumptions by induction on the number of steps from
gcnf to gcnf ′. From the well-formedness of gcnf ′ and the
assumption that the calculus for local monitor transitions
enforces guarantees, we conclude that gcnf ′ provides its
guarantees. Hence, gcnf ensures a sound use of modes.
VI. EXAMPLE PROGRAMMING LANGUAGE
As an example language, we use a simple concurrent imper-
ative language that supports multi-threading, communication
between threads using shared memory, coordination between
threads using barrier synchronization, and interaction between
a program and its environment using channels.
Expressions: We use Exp to denote the set of expressions
in our language and leave this set under-specified. We assume
that the expressions are free of side effects, and use judgment
e,mem ⇓ v to model that e ∈ Exp evaluates to v ∈ Val in
memory state mem ∈ Mem . Function vars : Exp → P(Var)
retrieves from an expression e ∈ Exp a set of variables that
contains all variables that the value of e might depend on. That
is, for all e ∈ Exp and mem,mem′ ∈ Mem , we have
(∀x ∈ vars(e) : mem(x) = mem′(x))
=⇒ (e,mem ⇓ v) =⇒ (e,mem′ ⇓ v)
Commands: The set of commands Com is defined by:
com ::= x := e | skip | com; com |
if e then com else com fi | while e do com od |
input ch to x | output e to ch | //γ// barrier |
stop | join | more e do com od | term
where x ∈ Var , e ∈ Exp, ch ∈ Ch , and γ ∈ Ann?. Terms
of the form stop, join, more e do com od, and term capture
snapshots of the control state at intermediate computation
points, and are not meant to be part of the surface syntax. The
sub-language without these terms is the programming language
to be used by a programmer.
The behavior of assignments, skip, semicolon, conditionals,
and loops is as usual. A command input ch to x reads the
next input from the channel ch into the variable x, and a
command output e to ch sends the value of the expression
e on the channel ch. The command barrier causes a thread
to block until all non-terminated threads jointly pass the
barrier. Annotations that request a mode state change are
placed as a comment in front of barrier commands as, e.g.,
in //·acq(A-NR, x)// barrier; skip. The control state stop
models that the execution of a subprogram has completed. The
control state join models that the join point of a conditional has
been reached. The control state more e do com od models that
a loop with the guard e and the body com has been entered
and that it will be decided next whether to execute the body or
to leave the loop. Finally, the control state term models that
the execution of an entire program has terminated.
Local Events: We define the set of local events Ev for
our example language by the grammar:
α ::= a(x, e) | s | b(e, com1, com2) | join |
enter(e, com) | more(e, com) | leave(e, com) |
input(x, ch, v) | output(ch, e, v) | sync | term
and χ : Ev → GEv , the abstraction function from local events
to global events, as follows:
χ(α) =
{
sync if α = sync
 otherwise
A local event a(x, e) models that the value of e ∈ Exp is being
assigned to x ∈ Var . The local event s models that a skip
command is being executed. A local event b(e, com1, com2)
models that a conditional with guard e ∈ Exp and the branches
com1 and com2 is being executed, where com1 and com2 are
the “then” and “else” branches respectively. The local event join
models that the join point of a conditional is being passed. The
local event enter(e, com) models that a loop while e do com od
is being entered. A local event more(e, com) models that the
guard e ∈ Exp of a loop with body com has evaluated to
a non-zero value, and the loop body com is being entered.
The local event leave(e, com) models that a loop with guard
e ∈ Exp and with body com is being left. A local event
output(ch, e, v) models that a value v ∈ Val resulting from
the evaluation of expression e ∈ Exp is being output to channel
ch ∈ Ch . A local event input(x, ch, v) models that v ∈ Val
is being received from ch ∈ Ch and stored in x ∈ Var . The
local events sync and term model that a barrier is being passed
and that the thread is about to terminate, respectively.
Note that our language for local events closely resembles
the syntax of our programming language, though there is
no one-to-one correspondence. Note also that some of our
local events capture information that goes beyond the actual
next computation step. For instance, b(e, com1, com2) provides
complete information about both branches of a conditional.
That is, this local event captures information about the next
computation steps, about computation steps that will occur
sometime in the future, and about computation steps that would
have occurred if the control flow were resolved differently.
Formal Semantics: Fig. 4 shows selected inference rules
for the calculus that defines which transitions on command
configurations are possible. The first two rules capture the
execution of assignments and skip. The third rule captures
the passing of a barrier. The fourth rule captures the choice
of a branch in a conditional. It inserts join into the resulting
control state to mark the join point. The fifth rule captures the
passing of a join point. All rules are shown in the full version,
including rules for sequential composition, loops, input and
output, and termination of programs.
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e,mem ⇓ v
(x := e,mem, τ)
a(x,e),_σ (stop,mem[x 7→ v], τ) (skip,mem, τ) s,_σ (stop,mem, τ) (//γ// barrier,mem, τ) sync,γ_σ (stop,mem, τ)
e,mem ⇓ v (v 6= 0 =⇒ i = 1) (v = 0 =⇒ i = 2)
(if e then com1 else com2 fi,mem, τ)
b(e,com1,com2),_σ (comi; join,mem, τ) (join,mem, τ) join,_σ (stop,mem, τ)
Fig. 4. Transitions between command configurations: selected rules
The requested mode state change, i.e., the first label on
the arrow, is empty (i.e., γ = ) in the conclusions of all
rules except for in the rule for barriers and one of the rules
for sequential composition. In the rule for barriers, the list
of annotations is retrieved from the comment that precedes
the barrier command. In the sequential composition rule, the
list of annotations is simply propagated from the premise to
the conclusion. This reflects our simplifying assumption from
Section III-B, that threads request mode state changes only
when synchronizing with other threads.
VII. ENFORCING INFORMATION FLOW SECURITY
THROUGH LOCAL MONITORING
We present our novel hybrid approach to establish
information-flow security for multi-threaded programs, building
on our monitoring framework from Section V. We specialize
our generic local monitor definition to a monitor that tracks
and controls information flow. This specialization satisfies the
requirements of Section V, modes are properly tracked and
guarantees are enforced. Our solution does not require any
modification of the global monitor definition from Section V.
We capture information-flow requirements by multi-level
security policies and prove the soundness of our approach with
respect to a knowledge-based definition of information-flow
security a` la [22]. We are able to establish such an end-to-end
security property through thread-local checks by exploiting
the assumptions that a thread makes about its environment.
The ability to perform rely-guarantee-style reasoning about
information-flow security within local monitors of individual
threads is a distinctive technical feature of our approach. The
practical value of this feature is that it substantially improves
precision of local monitoring. Without being able to exploit
assumptions, a local monitor would have to conservatively
secure the guarded thread for all possible environments,
resulting in severe restrictions on the behavior of threads.
The knowledge-based security definition requires that an
attacker cannot distinguish a given program run from certain
other hypothetical runs. To perform such counter-factual
reasoning, information about other possible runs is needed
within local monitors. This information is provided by the
local events that are emitted during steps of a thread. For
instance, the evaluation of the guard of a conditional emits
a local event b(e, com1, com2), which provides information
about the guard and both branches of the conditional. That
is, the approach to information-flow security proposed in this
section is a hybrid approach.
A. Information-Flow Security
A security policy is a tuple SP = (Lev,v,unionsq,⊥) consisting
of a set of security levels Lev, a partial order v⊆ Lev×Lev,
a least-upper-bound operator unionsq : (Lev×Lev) −→ Lev, and a
least security level ⊥ ∈ Lev. A domain assignment is a function
chlev : Ch → Lev that associates a security level with each
channel. Intuitively, the security level chlev(ch) of a channel
ch is the upper bound on the confidentiality of information
that the channel’s endpoint (e.g., a user or another system) is
permitted to learn. Thus, chlev(ch) constitutes an upper bound
on the confidentiality of information that might be received
from ch and of information that may be sent over ch. When it
is clear from context, we conflate channels with their security
levels, and write, e.g., ch v ` instead of chlev(ch) v `.
Attacker Model: We assume that each attacker is asso-
ciated with a security level, where an attacker at level ` can
observe all interactions on channels ch with ch v `, but cannot
observe interactions on other channels. To express what an
attacker at level ` observes during a program run, we project
the trace emitted during the run to the level `. We define the
projection of trace τ to security level ` by
τ ↓ ` =filter(τ, {inp(ch, v), out(ch, v)
| ch ∈ Ch, chlev(ch) v `, v ∈ Val}
That is, if τ is the trace produced by some run of a multi-
threaded program then an attacker at level ` observes τ ↓ `.
Based on his observations, an attacker can try to infer
information about the communication strategy used. To capture
an upper bound on the attacker’s knowledge about which
communication strategy might be in use, we define the function
κ : (Lev × PSt × Tr) −→ P(Σ) by
κ(`, pool, τ) ={
σ ∈ Σ
∣∣∣∣ ∃〈〈pool′,mem′, τ ′, gmon ′〉〉 ∈ reachσ(pool) :τ ′ ↓ ` = τ ↓ `
}
The set κ(`, pool, τ) contains all strategies that are compatible
with the observation τ ↓ ` and that thus, from the perspective
of an attacker at level `, might be in use. The smaller the set
κ(`, pool, τ), the more accurate the attacker’s knowledge. The
longer the trace that the attacker observes, the more accurate is
the attacker’s knowledge, i.e., attacker knowledge is monotonic
in the length of the trace the attacker observes.
Note that our definition of κ conservatively allows an attacker
to know the program. That is, κ(`, pool, τ) is an upper bound
on the knowledge of an attacker at level ` after this attacker
observes trace τ , even if the attacker knows the program that
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is contained in state pool. However, we assume the attacker
has no a-priori knowledge about which strategy is used.
Security Property: We regard strategies as confidential
information. An attacker at level ` should not be able to
distinguish two strategies that provide identical inputs at level
` and below when all prior interactions at level ` and below
are identical. We capture classes of strategies that should be
indistinguishable by the notion of `-equivalence, defined by
σ1 =` σ2 ,
∀ch ∈ Ch : ∀τ1, τ2 ∈ Tr :
(ch v ` ∧ τ1 ↓ `1 = τ2 ↓ `2) =⇒ σ1(τ1, ch) = σ2(τ2, ch)
We use a knowledge-based definition of information-flow
security, inspired by [22]. The property that we define is
progress-sensitive and suitable for our model from Section III.
Definition 1. We say that a pool state pool ∈ PSt is secure
for a level ` ∈ Lev iff
∀σ ∈ Σ : ∀〈〈pool′,mem′, τ ′, gmon ′〉〉 ∈ reachσ(pool) :
κ(`, pool, τ ′) ⊇ {σ′ ∈ Σ | σ =` σ′}
Our security property requires that if an attacker at level `
observes an execution starting in pool under strategy σ, then
his knowledge must be bounded by the set of strategies that are
`-equivalent to σ. That is, the attacker cannot learn anything
about the behavior of the actual strategy on any channel ch 6v `.
B. A Specialized Local Monitor
Our local monitor is parametric in the security policy SP =
(Lev,v,unionsq,⊥) and in the domain assignment chlev : Ch →
Lev. A third parameter is a function L : Var → Lev that
assigns a default security level to each variable. These three
parameters must be chosen identically for the local monitors
of all threads of a multi-threaded program.
Our local monitor maintains a local copy of the mode state
of the guarded thread. As a convention, we use lmdst as a
meta-variable for such copies of a thread’s mode state.
Typing Environment: Information flow into and out of
a variable x is constrained by the local monitor based on the
default security level L(x). However, if the guarded thread has
exclusive write-access to x and the thread previously wrote
information into x that is less confidential than L(x) then the
local monitor can use that. Moreover, if the guarded thread
has exclusive read-access to x then the local monitor may
allow the thread to temporarily store information in x that is
more confidential than L(x). The local monitor uses a typing
environment Γ to track the actual security level of variables
for which the guarded thread has exclusive access in some
sense. Formally, a typing environment is a partial function
Γ : FloatVar⇀Lev, where FloatVar ⊆ Var . The variables
whose security level may float might be limited, for instance,
because the run-time environment accesses some variables
while relying that they store information of a particular security
level (e.g., variables that define thread priorities, accessed by a
priority-based scheduler). The set of variables whose security
level must not float is NonFloatVar = Var \ FloatVar .
We lift a typing environment Γ : FloatVar⇀Lev to a total
function in Var → Lev by
Γ 〈x〉 =
{
Γ (x) if x ∈ pre(Γ )
L(x) otherwise
Mode-State-Says Notation: To improve readability, we
introduce a notation for properties of mode states. We write
mdst . fact (read “mdst says fact”) iff mode state mdst has
the property expressed by a fact from the following language
mayread(x) |maywrite(x) | exclusiveread(x) |
exclusivewrite(x) | othersmightread(x) | othersmightwrite(x)
with x ∈ Var . The semantics of mdst . fact are defined by:
mdst .mayread(x) , x 6∈ mdst(G-NR)
mdst .maywrite(x) , x 6∈ mdst(G-NW)
mdst . exclusiveread(x) , x ∈ mdst(A-NR)
mdst . exclusivewrite(x) , x ∈ mdst(A-NW)
mdst . othersmightread(x) , x 6∈ mdst(A-NR)
mdst . othersmightwrite(x) , x 6∈ mdst(A-NW)
For brevity, we write mdst.[fact1, . . . , factn] instead of mdst.
fact1, . . . , mdst . factn, a list of mode-state-says statements
concerning the same mode state. We write mdst .mayread(e)
instead of mdst . mayread(x1), . . . , mdst . mayread(xn′),
where vars(e) = {x1, . . . , xn′}.
Local Monitor States: A local monitor state is a tuple
〈Γ , lmdst, pc, br , time, term, block〉. Typing environment Γ :
FloatVar⇀Lev tracks the actual security level of variables
to which the guarded thread has exclusive access, as already
described. Mode state lmdst ∈ MdSt is the local monitor’s
copy of the mode state of the guarded thread. The pc stack
pc and branch environment stack br summarize, respectively,
the control flow decisions to reach the current program point,
and the behavior of the local monitor on execution paths not
taken. The pc stack is a stack of security levels, and the branch
environment stack is a stack of tuples, described below. Each
time the thread enters a conditional or loop, a security level
that bounds the control flow decision is pushed on the pc stack,
and a tuple that approximates the monitor’s behavior on the
branch not taken is pushed on the branch environment stack.
When a conditional or loop is exited, the top element of each
stack is popped.
To track information flow via internal timing, progress
channels, and monitor interventions, local monitor states
include timing level time : Lev, termination level term : Lev,
and blocking level block : Lev. Termination level term is
an upper bound on information that influenced termination
of loops prior to this point in the guarded thread’s execution.
The termination level only increases during thread execution.
Blocking level block is an upper bound on information that
influenced whether the monitor blocked or allowed thread
execution prior to this point in the execution. The blocking
level captures information flow via monitor interventions (or
lack of interventions), and only increases during execution.
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Timing level time is an upper bound on information since the
last synchronization that influenced when the guarded thread
reaches its current state. The timing level is lowered after
synchronization barriers, but otherwise only increases during
execution. The timing level describes the information that may
affect the relative timing of this guarded thread with respect
to other threads and is used to prevent internal timing leaks.
When a conditional or loop is exited, the timing, termination,
and blocking levels are updated to account for information
flows due to execution paths that could have been taken, but
weren’t. For example, when a loop is exited, the termination
level is increased to ensure that it is an upper bound of the
information that influenced the loop guard expression, which
determines how many times the loop is executed.
Calculus for Local Monitor Transitions: Selected infer-
ence rules for local monitor transitions are shown in Fig. 5. All
inference rules are presented and explained in the full version.
Rule (M-Assign1) is used for an assignment x := e when
x is readable by other threads, according to the current mode
state lmdst. Level ` bounds the information that might be
revealed by evaluating e at this point in the execution: it is
influenced by the level of the variables in e, by the decision to
execute this command (unionsqpc, the join of the pc stack), the fact
that the monitor did not previously block the thread (block ),
the fact that the thread did not previously diverge (term),
and the relative timing of this thread with respect to others
(time).1 Since other threads might read x, we require that ` is
bounded above by L(x), the default security level of x. Rule
(M-Assign2) is similar, but applies when x cannot be read by
other threads, which allows us to treat its level flow-sensitively.
In both cases Γ ′ is computed using operator Γ 〈x 7→lmdst `〉
(defined in Fig. 5) that returns an updated environment with
the type of variable x updated to ` depending on mode state
lmdst. Both rules require x to be writable and all variables in
e to be readable according to lmdst.
Rules (M-Branch) and (M-Join) handle conditionals. Recall
that monitor event b(e, com1, com2) and join are emitted,
respectively, when a thread enters and exits a conditional
if e then com1 else com2 fi. Rule (M-Branch) requires that the
local monitor’s mode state allows the thread to read the condi-
tional expression: lmdst.mayread(e). It uses the static bounds
oracle function SB(com,Γ , lmdst, pc, time, term, block) to
approximate the behavior of the monitor on both branches. This
is an on-the-fly static analysis (thus making the local monitor
hybrid) needed for the soundness of information-flow tracking.
Security level `sb returned by the oracle is an upper bound
on the decision about which branch to take, and the monitor
pushes it on pc stack pc. The other elements returned describe,
respectively, upper bounds on the timing level, termination
level, blocking level, and typing environment that the local
1Other threads may modify variables in e concurrently with this thread’s
execution, and thus the relative timing may influence the result of evaluating
e. If the guarded thread has exclusive write access to variables in e, then the
second premise could be replaced by ` = Γ 〈e〉unionsq(unionsqpc)unionsqtermunionsqblock , i.e.,
timing level time does not need to be included in the join. For simplicity, we
do not provide this additional precision.
monitor would have after completing the conditional. The
analysis in essence considers all possible executions of the
conditional, and approximates the behavior of the guarded
thread in these hypothetical executions. Level timesb is an
upper bound on information that affects when the conditional
finishes, termsb is an upper bound on information that affects
whether execution of the conditional will terminate or diverge,
block sb is an upper bound on the information that affects
whether the monitor will block the thread while executing
the conditional, and Γsb describes upper bounds on the typing
environment when the conditional terminates. Note that the
oracle is a partial function: if the result is undefined the monitor
blocks. For example, the result is undefined if a branch contains
a barrier command and the branch condition is not ⊥, since
synchronizations are publicly observable and should not depend
on confidential information. A full description of the static
bounds oracle (including the oracle’s semantic interface and an
implementation) is available in the full version of the paper.
Rule (M-Join) pops the top elements of the pc stack and the
static branching environment stack, and updates the variable
context, timing level, termination level, and blocking level to
account for potential information flows on the branch not taken.
Rule (M-Barrier-Local) regulates when a thread may syn-
chronize. The first premise ((unionsqpc)unionsqtermunionsqblock = ⊥) ensures
that the decision to reach a barrier is influenced only by
public information. The second premise computes the updated
mode state lmdst′. The remaining premises ensure that the
typing environments before and after the barrier (Γ and Γ ′
respectively) are appropriate based on the access this and other
threads may have to variables before and after the barrier.
The other monitor rules, not presented here, are: (M-Skip)
(for skip commands); (M-Input1), (M-Input2), and (M-Output)
for input and output commands; (M-Enter), (M-More), and
(M-Leave) for loops; and (M-Term) for terminated threads.
Theorem 2. Our calculus for local monitor transitions properly
tracks modes and enforces guarantees.
Proof sketch: Given a derivation of lmon −→δ,αperm lmon ′,
we show lmon ′.mdst = update(lmon.mdst, δ). This implies
that our calculus properly tracks modes. To prove that our
calculus enforces guarantees, we show that every local con-
figuration 〈[com, lmon,mdst],mem, τ〉 with a well-formed
thread state provides the no-write guarantee for each variable
x ∈ mdst(G-NW) and the no-read guarantee for each variable
y ∈ mdst(G-NR) by a case distinction on the local event
emitted when this local configuration performs a step.
From Theorems 1 and 2, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 1. If a global configuration is well formed and
justifies its assumptions then it ensures a sound use of modes.
Soundness of Information-Flow Control: Given a multi-
threaded program com1· . . . ·comn ∈ Com∗, we define the
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M-ASSIGN1
lmdst . [maywrite(x),mayread(e), othersmightread(x)]
` = Γ 〈e〉unionsqtimeunionsq(unionsqpc)unionsqtermunionsqblock ` v L(x) Γ ′ = Γ 〈x 7→lmdst `〉
〈Γ , lmdst, pc, br , time, term, block〉 −→,a(x,e)perm 〈Γ ′, lmdst, pc, br , time, term, block〉
M-ASSIGN2
lmdst . [maywrite(x),mayread(e), exclusiveread(x)] ` = Γ 〈e〉unionsqtimeunionsq(unionsqpc)unionsqtermunionsqblock Γ ′ = Γ 〈x 7→lmdst `〉
〈Γ , lmdst, pc, br , time, term, block〉 −→,a(x,e)perm 〈Γ ′, lmdst, pc, br , time, term, block〉
M-BRANCH
lmdst .mayread(e) (`sb, timesb, termsb, block sb,Γsb) = SB(if e then com1 else com2 fi,Γ , lmdst, pc, time, term, block)
〈Γ , lmdst, pc, br , time, term, block〉 −→,b(e,com1,com2)perm 〈Γ , lmdst, pc·`sb, br ·(timesb, termsb, block sb,Γsb), time, term, block〉
M-JOIN
time ′′ = time unionsq time ′ unionsq ` term ′′ = term unionsq term ′
block ′′ = block unionsq block ′
Γ ′′ = λx.

Γ (x) unionsq Γ ′(x) if x ∈ pre(Γ ) ∩ pre(Γ ′)
Γ (x) if x ∈ pre(Γ ) \ pre(Γ ′)
undef otherwise
〈Γ , lmdst, pc·`, br ·(time ′, term ′, block ′,Γ ′), time, term, block〉 −→,joinperm 〈Γ ′′, lmdst, pc, br , time ′′, term ′′, block ′′〉
M-BARRIER-LOCAL
(unionsqpc) unionsq term unionsq block = ⊥ lmdst′ = update(lmdst, δ)
pre(Γ ′) = {x | x ∈ FloatVar ∧ (lmdst′ . exclusiveread(x) ∨ lmdst′ . exclusivewrite(x))}
(lmdst . exclusiveread(x) ∧ lmdst′ . othersmightread(x)) =⇒ Γ (x)vL(x)
lmdst′ . exclusivewrite(x) =⇒ Γ ′(x) = Γ 〈x〉 (lmdst . othersmightwrite(x) ∧ lmdst′ . exclusiveread(x)) =⇒ Γ ′(x) = Γ 〈x〉
(lmdst . exclusivewrite(x) ∧ lmdst′ . [exclusiveread(x), othersmightwrite(x)]) =⇒ Γ ′(x) = Γ (x)unionsqL(x)
〈Γ , lmdst, pc, br , time, term, block〉 −→δ,syncperm 〈Γ ′, lmdst′, pc, br ,⊥,⊥,⊥〉
Γ 〈x 7→lmdst `〉(y) =

undef if y 6∈ pre(Γ )
Γ (y) if y ∈ pre(Γ ) ∧ y 6= x
` if y ∈ pre(Γ ) ∧ y = x ∧ lmdst . exclusivewrite(x) ∧ x ∈ FloatVar
`unionsqL(x) if y ∈ pre(Γ ) ∧ y = x ∧ lmdst . othersmightwrite(x) ∧ x ∈ FloatVar
Fig. 5. Local monitoring: selected rules
initial pool state for this program by
poolcom1·...·comn , [com1, lmoninit ,mdstinit ]· . . .
·[comn, lmoninit ,mdstinit ]
where mdstinit is the inital mode state, defined by
mdstinit(G-NR) = {} mdstinit(G-NW) = {}
mdstinit(A-NR) = {} mdstinit(A-NW) = {}
and lmoninit is the initial local monitor state, defined by
lmoninit , 〈Γinit ,mdstinit , , ,⊥,⊥,⊥〉
where Γinit : FloatVar⇀Lev is defined by pre(Γinit) = {}.
Theorem 3. If com1· . . . ·comn ∈ Com∗ is a multi-threaded
program such that each command comi is in the sub-language
meant to be used by the programmer (as defined in Section VI)
then poolcom1·...·comn is secure for every level ` ∈ Lev.
Proof sketch: Let global configuration gcnf =
〈〈poolcom1·...·comn ,meminit , τinit , gmoninit,n〉〉. Since gcnf is
well-formed and justifies its assumptions, we can soundly use
rely-guarantee reasoning based on Definition 1 and Corollary 1.
The rest of the proof is lengthy, but uses established proof
techniques. It shows that for any security level `, given an
execution of gcnf with strategy σ that produces trace τ , and
given an `-equivalent strategy σ′, there exists an execution of
gcnf with σ′ that produces trace τ ′ such that τ ↓ ` = τ ′ ↓ `.
Thus, the knowledge of an attacker at level ` that observes
trace τ will include both σ and σ′.
When our monitoring framework is instantiated with the
information-flow control local monitors, it accepts all the
secure executions from Section II (with appropriate annotations
to indicate assumptions), and correctly rejects the insecure
executions (by a local monitor blocking at an appropriate point
in the execution). This work presents the first hybrid progress-
sensitive information-flow control monitoring framework for
concurrent programs that uses fine-grained rely-guarantee
reasoning about shared memory. As such, it is the only
sound monitoring framework that accepts all secure execution
examples from Section II. The examples, though simple, exhibit
typical patterns of concurrent programs, and of programs that
manipulate information of differing sensitivity.
VIII. RELATED WORK
Static enforcement: Most existing work on information-
flow security in concurrent programs uses static techniques.
Volpano and Smith [23] provide a type system that enforces
probabilistic noninterference in concurrent programs by pro-
viding an atomic construct, and preventing high-security loop
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guards. Russo and Sabelfeld [24] remove the need for the
atomic construct under cooperative scheduling. Sabelfeld and
Sands [25] provide a type system that ensures probabilistic
noninterference for a wide class of schedulers, that also prevents
high-security loop guards, and uses Agat’s padding technique
to prevent timing leaks [26]. Smith [27] presents a type system
that reasons precisely about what information influences the
timing of executions, prevents timing leaks, and thus enforces
probabilistic noninterference for concurrent programs.
Andrews and Reitman [28] present an axiomatic program
logic to reason about information flow in sequential and
concurrent programs. They use two special “certification
variables” in their logic, local and global , which correspond
to the pc level and the termination level respectively.
Boudol and Castellani [29] analyze the program and sched-
uler, and give a type system such that well-typed schedulers and
threads satisfy noninterference, which Barthe and Nieto [30]
verify. Barthe et al. [31] add mechanisms during compilation
to enable a security-aware scheduler to enforce security.
Sabelfeld [7] considers a concurrent language with
semaphores, and provides a type system that enforces security.
High loops are not allowed, and padding is used to prevent
timing leaks, for both branches and fork commands.
Zdancewic and Myers [17] propose that non-determinism
should not be observable by low-security users (including
non-determinism arising from scheduling, data races, etc.)
and present a type system that enforces low-observational
determinism for single memory locations. Their enforcement
mechanism allows the pc level to be reset at thread synchroniza-
tion points, similar to our lowering of the timing level at barrier
synchronizations. Huisman et al. [32] note that the security
condition may permit more information flow than intended
and strengthen the condition. Terauchi [33] further improves
this condition and enforces it via a fractional-capability type
system, which permits updates of a thread’s capabilities upon
synchronization. This bears similarities to our updates of modes
at synchronization points, but fractional capabilities and modes
are different. For instance, in our framework a thread may
have exclusive write access to a variable without exclusive read
access. In contrast to all three articles, our security condition
does not demand low-observable determinism.
Mantel and Sudbrock [34] present a security condition that
allows nondeterminism in concurrent programs provided secret
information does not influence this nondeterminism. They
present a type system that enforces security for a broad class
of schedulers: once a thread’s timing or termination behavior
is influenced by secret information, it may not interact with
low-security threads. Muller and Chong [21] also permit low-
observable nondeterminism via a type system for an extension
of the X10 programming language.
Mantel, Sands, and Sudbrock [12] use rely-guarantee rea-
soning to support flow-sensitive security types in concurrent
programs, thus allowing more precise enforcement of security.
Our approach is inspired by theirs, but we exploit and justify
rely-guarantee reasoning dynamically rather than statically.
Hybrid and dynamic enforcement: By contrast with
static enforcement techniques, our approach is hybrid, combin-
ing static and dynamic techniques. This enables more precise
enforcement of security, since static techniques must accept or
reject a program in its entirety, whereas dynamic and hybrid
techniques can accept or reject single executions.
Le Guernic [13] presents the first hybrid monitor for
concurrent programs. It is flow sensitive, but uses a single
monitor (and single type environment) for the entire thread
pool, which restricts concurrency. To handle locks, the monitor
uses static analysis to determine when a thread might require a
lock, and acquires it before any high branch in that thread, thus
ensuring lock acquisition does not depend on secret information.
Le Guernic’s monitor suppresses insecure output instead of
blocking the thread. We block threads rather than modify the
semantics of programs by altering or suppressing outputs.
Stefan et al. [35] present a dynamic termination-sensitive
information-flow control mechanism. Their mechanism does
not rely on a single global monitor but rather uses coarse-
grained containers with “floating labels,” where the label of
the container is increased based on information read by the
container, and the label restricts writes and other observable
effects. In addition to preventing internal timing leaks, they
mitigate external timing leaks using predictive mitigation [36].
We do not address external timing leaks, but enforce security
at finer granularity (i.e., per program variable) and with greater
precision (through flow-sensitivity).
IX. CONCLUSION
We have developed a novel framework to monitor concur-
rent programs, and instantiated this framework to enforce a
knowledge-based progress-sensitive noninterference security
condition in concurrent programs where threads share memory
resources at the granularity of individual memory locations.
The framework uses a single global monitor to ensure
that threads can soundly use rely-guarantee reasoning about
shared memory. Each thread has its own local monitor that
both enforces thread guarantees regarding shared memory,
and also tracks and controls information flow within the
thread. The global monitor is accessed only when threads
synchronize, ensuring that the monitoring framework does
not needlessly restrict concurrency. The local monitors are
hybrid: they combine dynamic techniques for information-flow
control with on-the-fly static program analysis to approximate
information flow on untaken execution paths. Local monitor
precision is improved by using rely-guarantee reasoning.
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